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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Constitutional Law-FREEDOM OF THE PRESS-PRISON REGULATION
PROHIBITING INTERVIEWS BETWEEN NEWSMEN AND INMATES HELD
CONSTITUTIONAL
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974)
"On any given day, approximately 1,500,000 people are under
the authority of [federal, state and local] prison systems. The cost
to taxpayers is over one billion dollars annually. Of those indi-
viduals sentenced to prison, 98% will return to society." The
public's 'interest in being informed about prisons is thus
paramount.'
A major purpose of a newspaper is to disseminate information
in a responsible and accurate manner so that the general public
may better understand important social issues.2  The first
amendment, 3 through its guarantee of freedom of the press, serves
as the guardian of the public's right to be informed.4 But the press
, Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 840 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan
& Marshall, JJ.), quoting SUBCOMM. ON COURTS, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., 21 SESs., REPORT ON THE
INSPECTION OF FEDERAL FACILITIES AT LEAVENWORTH PENITENTIARY AND THE MEDICAL
CENTER FOR FEDERAL PRISONERS 2 (Comm. Print 1974).
2 Once informed, the public can exert pressure on elected officials, directing them to
correct the social problems. In 1971, for instance, the Staten Island Advance carried a series
of articles on Willowbrook, a large institution in New York City which housed more than
5,000 mentally retarded persons, half of whom were children. These articles were followed
up by Geraldo Rivera of WABC-TV, who, despite official obstacles, filmed the deplorable
conditions existing within the institution. The public reaction based upon the information
provided by the media was vigorous enough to persuade then Governor Rockefeller to add
millions of dollars to the state's budget for the mentally handicapped. Vanden Heuvel, The
Press and the Prisons, 11 COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. 35, 38 (1972).
3 Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.
U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
4 The Supreme Court has often recognized the important role the press plays as the
public's informer. In Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945), the Court
observed that "the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonis-
tic sources is essential to the welfare of the public .... " In Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
64, 77 (1964), the Court, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, upheld "the paramount public
interest in a free flow of information to the people concerning public officials, their
servants." That same year, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964), the
Court found a "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement,
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." "The
Constitution specifically selected the press .... " declared the Court in Mills v. Alabama, 384
U.S. 214, 219 (1966), "to play an important role in the discussion of public affairs."
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must be able to gather information from diverse sources before it
can synthesize and disseminate its findings.
In the early 1970's, there was considerable uncertainty as to
whether boundaries could legally be drawn around the news-
gathering function of the press, 5 and when newsmen sought to
gain access to prisons the federal courts were forced to decide
between prison regulations which prohibited newsmen from con-
ducting face-to-face interviews with designated inmates and the
assertions of reporters that such interviews were essential to the
performance of their task.6 Since there was no established
framework for dealing with this issue the different circuits predict-
ably reached contradictory conclusions.7 At one end of the spec-
trum was Seattle-Tacoma Newspaper Guild, Local 82 v. Parker,8 where
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld a ban on
press-inmate interviews as a reasonable regulation whose promulga-
tion was within the scope of the discretion of the prison administra-
tion. At the other end was Washington Post Co. v. Kleindienst,9 where
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit struck
The rationale for the constitutional protection of the informing function of the press
has been eloquently stated by Justice Black, in New York Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (concurring opinion):
in the First Amendment the Founding Fathers gave the free press the protec-
tion it must have to fulfill its essential role in our democracy. The press was to serve
the governed, not the governors. The Government's power to censor the press was
abolished so that the press would remain forever free to censure the Government.
The press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform
the people.
The critical role which the press is called upon to play in our society has been
acknowledged, not only by the courts, but also by numerous authors and constitutional
scholars. See, e.g., T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970); E. HUDON,
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN AMERICA (1963); W. LIPPMANN, LIBERTY AND THE NEWS
(1920); A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND iTS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948).
5 See Note, The Right of the Press to Gather Information, 71 COLUM. L REV. 838 (1971);
Note, The Rights of the Public and the Press to Gather Information, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1505 (1974).
See also New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
' See, e.g., Washington Post Co. v. Kleindienst, 494 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd sub nom.
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974); McMillan v. Carlson, 493 F.2d 1217 (1st
Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Seattle-Tacoma Newspaper Guild, Local 82 v. Parker, 480 F.2d
1062 (9th Cir. 1973); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Bork, 370 F. Supp. 1135 (D. Mass. 1974);
Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Kleindienst, 364 F. Supp. 719 (S.D. Tex. 1973); Hillery
v. Procunier, 364 F. Supp. 196 (N.D. Cal. 1973), vacated sub nom. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S.
817 (1974); Mitford v. Pickett, 363 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. I1. 1973); Burnham v. Oswald, 342
F. Supp. 880 (W.D.N.Y. 1972); Burnham v. Oswald, 333 F. Supp. 1128 (W.D.N.Y. 1971).
The authority to promulgate regulations for the administration of federal prisons is
provided in 18 U.S.C. §§ 4041, 4042 (1970) and 18 U.S.C. § 4001 (Supp. III, 1973).
" See notes 88-99 and accompanying text infra.
8 480 F.2d 1062 (9th Cir. 1973).
9 494 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd sub nom. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843
(1974).
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down a similar ban on press-inmate interviews as an unconstitu-
tional abridgment of the freedom of the press.
In resolving this conflict between the circuits, the Supreme
Court, in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,'0 by a 5-4 majority, reversed
the latter decision, agreed with Seattle-Tacoma, and denied the
asserted right of the press to gather information from inmates by
means of personal interviews. The boundary drawn around the
newsgathering function of the press restricted newsmen to gather-
ing information solely from those sources generally available to the
public.
I
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.
When Ben Bagdikian, a reporter for the Washington Post, was
denied permission to conduct interviews with designated inmates at
the Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, and Danbury, Connecticut, prisons,"
pursuant to the Bureau of Prisons Policy Statement 1220.1A,
paragraph 4(b)(6),12 he and the Washington Post brought suit to
enjoin enforcement of that regulation. Balancing the government's
interest in prison administration 3  against first amendment
10 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
11 Work stoppages in 1972 at Lewisburg and Danbury prisons had apparently been
resolved through negotiations between the warden and inmate representatives. The
Washington Post had received information which led it to believe that some members of the
inmate negotiating committees might have been punished for the role which they had
played during the disturbances. The newspaper was interested in publicizing not only the
apparently peaceful settlements, but also the brutality and retaliation, if proven. Washington
Post Co. v. Kleindienst, 357 F. Supp. 770, 771 (D.D.C. 1972), modified and aff'd, 494 F.2d 994
(D.C. Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nom. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
'" The Bureau of Prisons Policy Statement 1220.1A, 4(b)(6) provided:
Press representatives will not be permitted to interview individual inmates. This
rule shall apply even where the inmate requests or seeks an interview. However,
conversation may be permitted with inmates whose identity is not to be made
public, if it is limited to the discussion of institutional facilities, programs and
activities.
Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Policy Statement 1220.1A, Inmate Correspondence
with Representatives of the Press and News Media, Feb. 11, 1972 [hereinafter cited as Policy
Statement]. The Policy Statement is set out in full as an appendix in Washington Post Co. v.
Kleindienst, 357 F. Supp. 770, 776-78 (D.D.C. 1972).
13 It was the government's contention that the press had no constitutional right of
access to inmates for confidential interviews, and that the Policy Statement, which permitted
uncensored correspondence between inmates and the media, as well as casual conversations
held in the course of prison tours, provided sufficient access and was not arbitrary. In
refusing to permit press-inmate interviews, the Bureau of Prisons was prompted by consid-
erations of administrative convenience and possible disciplinary problems which press
attention to particular inmates might engender. 357 F. Supp. at 773.
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freedoms, 14 District Judge Gesell of the District of Columbia re-
jected the contention that legal and practical considerations neces-
sitated a total ban on press-inmate interviews, and held in favor of
the plaintiffs.15 In affirming, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit noted that the Bureau's policy governing press
interviews placed greater restrictions upon press access to informa-
tion than were placed upon the visitation rights of inmates'
families, friends, attorneys, and religious counsel. 6 "Thus, while
we do not question that the concerns voiced by the Bureau are
legitimate interests that merit protection," concluded Circuit Judge
McGowan, "we must agree with the District Court that they do not,
individually or in total, justify the sweeping absolute ban that the
Bureau has chosen to impose. '"17
14 In weighing the first amendment freedoms, Judge Gesell did not distinguish the
rights of the press from those of the prisoners:
As this inquiry is pursued there is no need to differentiate between the rights
of the press and the rights of prisoners committed to the custody of the Bureau.
News gathering and news dissemination cannot be disassociated under circum-
stances such as these where it is assumed there is a mutual desire to communicate
and where, in the last analysis, the public right to be informed may well overshadow
either of the other two considerations.
Id. at 773-74.
15 Id. at 770. The judgment of the district court was stayed by the Supreme Court
pending appeal to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 406 U.S. 912
(1972). The court of appeals remanded for additional findings of fact and particularly for
reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665 (1972). 477 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See notes 45-57 and accompanying text
infra. On remand, the district court adhered to its former decision. 357 F. Supp. 779 (D.D.C.
1972). The court of appeals modified and affirmed. 494 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1974). It held
that press interviews with inmates could not be totally prohibited, as the Policy Statement
purported to do, but could
be denied only where it is the judgment of the administrator directly concerned,
based on either the demonstrated behavior of the inmate, or special conditions
existing at the institution at the time the interview is requested, or both, that the
interview presents a serious risk of administrative or disciplinary problems.
494 F.2d at 1006-07.
16 494 F.2d at 997. The court of appeals had a twofold answer to the government's
contention that prison authorities had provided for alternative means of communication.
Quoting what the Supreme Court had recently said in Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753,
765 (1972), the court of appeals answered that "[tihis argument overlooks what may be
particular qualities inherent in sustained, face-to-face debate, discussion and questioning."
More important, said the court, the government's underlying factual premise was rejected in
the district court's findings of fact. 494 F.2d at 999, 1000. See note 56 and accompanying text
infra.
17 494 F.2d at 1005.
There were two fundamental concerns which prompted the Bureau of Prisons to
develop the ban on press-inmate interviews. The issue most contested in the district court,
and upon which extensive fact-finding hearings were held, was characterized as the "big
wheel" phenomenon. It was the Bureau's belief that press interviews with "big wheels," those
inmates who exert power and influence within the institution, would encourage the negative
and hostile elements of the prison to follow a disruptive path. The result, claimed the
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The United States Supreme Court, however, did not agree
with either the district court or the court of appeals. 18 On June 24,
1974, the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Stewart, an-
nounced in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,' 9 and in the companion
case, Pell v. Procunier,2 o that newsmen do not have a constitutional
right to conduct face-to-face interviews with prison inmates.2 1
Despite the existence of an extensive factual record (developed in
the lower courts) evidencing the inadequacy of the other means of
communication permitted by the Policy Statement,22 the Supreme
Bureau, would be the failure of institutional discipline, security, and rebabilitative efforts. Id.
at 1002, 1003. But the district court found tbat the "big wheel" justification did not
withstand analysis. Since only a few easily identifiable prisoners would fall into the "big
wheel" category, a blanket ban on all interviews was not justified. 357 F. Supp. at 781. The
other major justification advanced by the Bureau, in defense of its complete ban on
press-inmate interviews, was tbat it is necessary for the maintenance of discipline among the
inmates to treat all prisoners under a uniform set of rules. Individual distinctions in
behavior were not to serve as the basis for deciding whether to allow interviews with the
press. 494 F.2d at 1003, 1004. However, the district court found that the recognition of the
first amendment rights of prisoners required a more flexible approach than that advanced
by the Bureau; in fact, an approach based on individualized judgments in particular cases
was found to be required. 357 F. Supp. at 781-82.
"8 The Supreme Court reversed tbe court of appeals and remanded the case to the
district court. 417 U.S. at 850.
At the time that the case was in the district court and the court of appeals, the Policy
Statement prohibited any personal interviews between newsmen and individually designated
federal prison inmates. Prior to consideration of the case by the Supreme Court, the
Solicitor General informed the Court that the regulation had recently been amended to
permit press interviews at minimum security federal prisons. Id. at 844.
19 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
20 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
21 The Supreme Court found that the policies of the Federal Bureau of Prisons
regarding visits to prison inmates, as challenged in Saxbe, did not differ significantly from
the California policies considered by the Court in Pell. InPell, state prison inmates, as well as
journalists, brought actions in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California challenging the constitutionality, under the first and fourteenth amendments, of a
state regulation which prohibited face-to-face interviews between newsmen and designated
inmates. A three-judge panel of the district court granted the inmates' motion for summary
judgment, holding that their first and fourteenth amendment freedoms were unconstitu-
tionally abridged, but dismissed the action of the newsmen. On appeal, tbe United States
Supreme Court reversed as to the inmates, affirmed as to the journalists, and vacated the
judgment, remanding the case to the district court. The Supreme Court concluded, in view
of the inmates' alternative channels of communication, that the regulation did not abridge
the inmates' freedom of speech. In addition, the Court held that the regulation did not
abridge the freedom of the press, since the regulation did not deny the media access to
sources of information available to members of the general public.
22 On the basis of.. . substantial and uncontroverted evidence, the District Court
found that the sources of information provided by Policy Statement 1220.1A were
inadequate to permit the news media to develop an accurate and penetrating
knowledge of prison conditions or events, and that accurate and effective news
reporting about prison conditions is critically dependent on the opportunity for
personal interviews with the inmate population.
494 F.2d at 1000.
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Court found that members of the press were accorded sufficient
access to inmates in light of the legitimate requirements of prison
administration. 23 Significantly, in upholding the blanket ban on
press-inmate interviews, the Court found it unnecessary to engage
in any "delicate balancing"24 of first amendment rights against
penal considerations:
For it is apparent that the sole limitation imposed on newsgather-
ing by Policy Statement 1220.1A is no more than a particularized
application of the general rule that nobody may enter the prison
and designate an inmate whom he would like to visit, unless the
prospective visitor is a lawyer, clergyman, relative, or friend of
that inmate.25
II
CONFINING THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The first amendment has traditionally been accorded great
respect by the Supreme Court.26 Its favored position 27 among the
constitutional rights has been reflected in Supreme Court decisions
which have held that only a compelling state interest could justify
limiting first amendment freedoms.28 In recent years, federal
courts have grappled with the difficult task of deciding to what
extent the first amendment rights of inmates survive incarceration.
A trend of protecting the asserted right of inmates to freely
exchange ideas and expressions of feeling with the outside world
seemed to be gathering momentum in the lower courts.29 In Pell
23 417 U.S. at 847-48.
24 Id. at 849.
25 Id.
26 See note 4 supra.
27 According to Professor Emerson, there are four functions of the first amendment
right to freedom of expression which justify its favored position among the constitutional
rights: (1) freedom of expression stimulates self-realization and development of character;
(2) freedom of expression is invaluable in attaining the truth; (3) freedom of expression
allows all members of society to participate in the democratic decision-making process
through open debate; and (4) freedom of expression aids the achievement of the com-
promises necessary for the operation of a viable democracy. Emerson, Toward a General
Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 878-86 (1963).
28 See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (no compelling state interest to
justify infringement of religious freedom); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444 (1963) (no
substantial regulatory interest to prohibit the advocacy of racial equality); Thomas v. Collins,
323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) (restriction of first amendment liberties justifiable only by clear and
present danger to public welfare).
9 Surviving prisoners' rights are not limited to those protected by the first amendment.
One line of cases has developed a due process right of access to the courts. The development
began with Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941), which recognized that a prisoner has a right
1975]
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and Saxbe, however, the Court has allowed prison officials to
infringe not only the first amendment rights of inmates, but also
those of newsmen and the general public.
A. The Right of Inmates to Gain Access to the Press
The constitutional right of inmates to seek personal interviews
with members of the press was not explored in Saxbe because
inmates were not a party to the litigation.30 In Pell v. Procunier,31
however, the Court did explore this dimension of the first amend-
ment, and rejected the inmates' claims. Starting with the proposi-
tion that "'[1]awful incarceration brings about the necessary with-
drawal or limitation of many privileges and rights'"32 the Court
proceeded to balance the free speech rights of inmates against the
state's legitimate interests in deterrence, rehabilitation, and the
internal security of penal institutions.33 Determining that alterna-
tive channels of communication remained open to inmates, the
Court refused to find that a restriction on one manner of com-
munication was sufficient to violate a prisoner's first amendment
rights. 34
to apply to the federal courts for a writ of habeas corpus, despite the holding of the court
which denied the petitioner's release from prison. This development has been extended to
the right to correspond with courts, Stiltner v. Rhay, 322 F.2d 314 (9th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 920 (1964), and with attorneys on matters relating to legal assistance, Nolan
v. Scafati, 430 F.2d 548 (1st Cir. 1970). Accord, Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
With explicit reference to first amendment rights, courts have held that these rights
survive incarceration to the fullest extent consistent with prison discipline and security. See
Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d 545 (1st Cir. 1971) (right to send letters to news media);
Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049, 405 U.S. 978
(1972) (right to possess one's own writings); Brown v Peyton, 437 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1971)
(right to receive black publications and religious literature); Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23
(5th Cir. 1969) (right to receive black muslim newspaper and right to correspond with
religious leader); Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1968) (right to receive black
publications); Payne v. Whitmore, 325 F. Supp. 1191 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (right to receive
newspapers and magazines); Fortune Society v. McGinnis, 319 F. Supp. 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
(right to receive newsletter on prison reform published by former inmates and often critical
of prison authorities); Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (right to
send letter to family critical of prison officials and prison administration).
30 In Seale v. Manson, 326 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Conn. 1971), the district court held that a
restriction which denied unconvicted inmates the right to talk to reporters without the
express approval of the Commissioner of Corrections was reasonable, in light of the belief
that the limitation of interviews was required to prevent inmates from becoming "big
wheels" in the institution. The court denied the inmates' contention that the restriction was
an unconstitutional abridgment of their freedom of speech.
31 417 U.S. 817 (1974). The district court decision, Hillery v. Procunier, 364 F. Supp.
196, 201 (N.D. Cal. 1973), had enjoined application of California's ban on press-inmate
interviews because the court found that the prohibition infringed the first amendment rights
of prisoners.
32 417 U.S. at 822, quoting Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948).
33 417 U.S. at 822-24.
34 Id. at 824-28.
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Despite an earlier Supreme Court pronouncement that "f:Jed-
eral courts sit not to supervise prisons but to enforce the constitu-
tional rights of all 'persons,' including prisoners,"'35 the reluctance
of the Pell Court to assert full-fledged first amendment rights on
behalf of prisoners was not surprising. The federal courts tradi-
tionally have refused to substitute their supervision for the exper-
tise of prison officials, a tendency which has been referred to as the
"hands-off" doctrine. 36 Although the Pell Court initially appeared
to depart from this principle when it openly engaged in a balanc-
ing process which weighed prisoners' rights against penal
considerations,37 a troublesome aspect of the balancing technique
used was the measure of judicial deference given to the testimony
of corrections officials. In short, too much deference predeter-
mined the result, and in this respect the outcome paralleled a
traditional application of the "hands-off" doctrine. 8 Although
35 Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972).
36 The terminology "hands-off" refers to the fact that courts have often refused to
review the administration and supervision of institutions under the authority of the Attorney
General and the Bureau of Prisons. See, e.g., Garcia v. Steele, 193 F.2d 276, 278 (8th Cir.
1951) (no supervisory jurisdiction of courts over conduct of various institutions); In re
Taylor, 187 F.2d 852, 853 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 955 (1951) (not within province of
courts); Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850, 851-52 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 829 (1951)
(not function of courts); Sturm v. McGrath, 177 F.2d 472, 473 (10th Cir. 1949) (no power of
court to superintend).
More recently, in Mitford v. Pickett, 363 F. Supp. 975, 978 (E.D. 111. 1973), the court
stated that "the regulation pertaining to the limitation of personal interviews of inmates by
the press is a matter within the internal affairs of the prison. This Court will not interfere
with such regulation .... "
37 417 U.S. at 824. See also Morales v. Schmidt, 489 F.2d 1335, 1343 (7th Cir. 1973).
38 There are additional grounds for criticizing the Court's reasoning in Pell. The Court
reviewed the visitation policy of the California Corrections Department which permitted
inmates to receive limited visits from members of their families, the clergy, their attorneys,
and their friends, and concluded that this was not a case in which the selection of these
categories of visitors was based upon the anticipated content of the communication. 417 U.S.
at 825. However, if the theory that press-inmate interviews can create "hig wheels" is to have
the validity which is assumed by the Court in both Pell, id. at 831-32, and Saxbe, id. at
848-49, it would seem that it must be the content of the communication which creates the
"big wheel." The "big wheel" theory is based upon the belief that what an inmate tells a
newsman may then be publicized outside the prison. When the news returns to the prison,
whether by newspaper, television, or radio, the inmate can gain status and power within the
institution and may become a disruptive force. Id. at 866-69. It is therefore the content of
the interview which either is or is not newsworthy and it is the content of the interview which
arguably makes certain inmates "big wheels" in the eyes of other prisoners.
The Court further contended that there are two alternative ways in which inmates can
communicate with the press: (1) through their families, friends, clergy, or attorneys, who are
permitted to visit them at the prison; and (2) through correspondence with members of the
press. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 824-25 (1974); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417
U.S. 843, 846-47 (1974). However, if these alternative means of communication are effec-
tive, the Court failed to explain why they would be less likely than interviews to create "hig
wheels." In Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d 545, 548-49 (1st Cir. 1971), Judge Coffin held that
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deterrence, rehabilitation, and prison discipline must be consid-
ered in determining the scope of first amendment rights within the
prison environment, 39 these penal interests do not justify "broad
prophylactic rules"'40 in a first amendment context without a show-
ing of a compelling state interest. As Justice Douglas said in his
dissent, "the State can hardly defend an overly broad restriction on
expression by demonstrating that it has not eliminated expression
completely."'41
B. The Right of Newsmen to Gather Information
The decision in Saxbe was directed at interpreting the scope of
the asserted right of newsmen to gather information. The Su-
preme Court had considered the newsgathering right in past
decisions, but had not been directly confronted with the need to
expressly define the limits of the asserted right.42 In Zemel v. Rusk,
the Supreme Court announced that "[tlhe right to speak and
publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather
information. '' 43 But Zemel's helpfulness was limited in that it set no
boundaries on the right to gather information. Furthermore, Zemel
did not involve the claim of a newsman attempting to gather news
but rather that of a person allegedly seeking to inform himself by
state prison inmates had the right to send letters to the press notwithstanding the contention
that letters would return to the prison as "letters to the editor" or news stories which would
cause fellow prisoners to strike or riot.
39 First amendment principles must always be applied "in light of the special charac-
teristics of the ... environment .... " Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District,
393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
40 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
41 Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 838 (1974) (Douglas J., dissenting, joined by Brennan
& Marshall, JJ.).
In support of this position, Douglas quoted Justice Black:
"I cannot accept my Brother Harlan's view [in dissent] that the abridgment of
speech and press here does not violate the First Amendment because other
methods of communication are left open. This reason for abridgment strikes me
as being on a par with holding that governmental suppression of a newspaper in a
city would not violate the First Amendment hecause there continue to be radio and
television stations. First Amendment freedoms can no more validly be taken away
by degrees than by one fell swoop
Id.
42 Cases which have recognized that newsmen have a first amendment right to gather
information include: McMillan v. Carlson, 493 F.2d 1217 (Ist Cir. 1974) (per curiam);
Schnell v. Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1969); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Bork, 370 F.
Supp. 1135 (D. Mass. 1974); Lewis v. Baxley, 368 F. Supp. 768 (M.D. Ala. 1973); Consumers
Union v. Periodical Correspondents' Ass'n, 365 F. Supp. 18 (D.D.C. 1973); Burnham v.
Oswald, 342 F. Supp. 880 (W.D.N.Y. 1972); Quad-City Community News Service, Inc. v.
Jebens, 334 F. Supp. 8 (S.D. Iowa 1971).
43 Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
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traveling to Cuba.44 More recently, in Branzburg v. Hayes,45 the
Supreme Court acknowledged the right of newsmen to gather
information, stating that "without some protection for seeking out
the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated. '' 46 However,
in addressing itself to how much protection should be granted to
newsmen, the Branzburg Court concluded that "the First Amend-
ment does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special
access to information not available to the public generally. ''47 In
Saxbe,48 as in Pell, 49 the Supreme Court relied upon this language
in Branzburg to deny the asserted first amendment right.
The soundness of the Court's application of Branzburg's broad
language to the factual situation of Saxbe is open to criticism. Branz-
burg held that the first amendment did not relieve a newsman of
the obligation that all citizens have to respond to a grand jury
subpoena and answer questions relevant to a criminal
investigation. 50 The Branzburg Court rejected a reporter's argu-
ment that if he were to testify before the grand jury and reveal
information given to him in confidence, his sources of information
would dry up, thereby infringing his right to gather news. The
Court analyzed the asserted testimonial privilege by balancing the
specific interests involved. It balanced the importance of the grand
jury-especially its broad investigatory powers-to the adjudicatory
process, against the uncertain possibility that a newsman's sources
might dry up.51 The Court implied that under special circum-
44 After the United States had broken diplomatic relations with Cuba and the Depart-
ment of State had eliminated Cuba from the area for which passports were not required,
Zemel applied to have his passport validated for travel to Cuba allegedly to satisfy his
curiosity and to make himself a better informed citizen. His request was denied, and he filed
suit in federal district court seeking a judgment declaring that he was entitled under the
Constitution and laws of the United States to travel to Cuba and to have his passport
validated for that purpose. He further claimed that the Secretary of State's travel restrictions
were invalid, and that the Passport Act of 1926, 22 U.S.C. § 211a (1970), and § 215 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1970), were unconstitutional.
In addition, Zemel sought to have the Secretary anal the Attorney General enjoined from
interfering with his travel. The Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for the
Secretary and dismissed the action against the Attorney General.
45 408 U.S. 664 (1972).
46 Id. at 681.
47 Id. at 684.
48 417 U.S. at 850.
49 417 U.S. at 833-34
50 408 U.S. at 693-95.
51 Id. Branzburg adds constitutional support to a common law principle which has been
recognized for more than three centuries; the right of the public to receive every man's
evidence. It is this puhlic right which compels a reporter to testify before a grand jury, even
though he may be forced to reveal his source of confidential information. As stated by
Wigmore:
1975]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
stances a newsman's right to gather information might be out-
weighed. The majority observed that, "[diespite the fact that news
gathering may be hampered, the press is regularly excluded from
grand jury proceedings, our own conferences, the meetings of
other official bodies in executive session, and the meetings of
private organizations. '52 Significantly, in each special circumstance
noted by the Branzburg Court, the rationale for press exclusion was
the paramount need for secrecy. It is therefore ironic that the Su-
preme Court in Saxbe, following the reasoning of Pell, relied upon
Branzburg while simultaneously emphasizing that the ban on press-
inmate- interviews "is not part of any attempt by the Federal
Bureau of Prisons to conceal from the public the conditions pre-
vailing in federal prisons. '53
In Saxbe, the Supreme Court so completely deferred to the
expertise of prison officials that it denied the need to balance at
all. 54 Implicit was the assumption that the Federal Bureau of
Prisons had already balanced the competing interests in formulat-
ing the Policy Statement. In effect, the Court unceremoniously
transferred the traditional "hands-off" doctrine from the prison-
ers' rights dimension of first amendment freedoms to the news-
gathering function.55 No objective standard was offered by the
When the course ofjustice requires the investigation of the truth, no man has any
knowledge that is rightly private. All that society can fairly be expected to concede
is that it will not exact this knowledge when necessity does not demand it, or when
the benefit gained by exacting it would in general be less valuable than the
disadvantage caused; and the various privileges are merely attempts to define the
situations in which, by experience, the exaction would be unnecessary or disadvan-
tageous. The duty runs on throughout all, and does not abate; it is merely
sometimes not insisted upon.
8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2192, at 72 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682 (1972).
52 408 U.S. at 684-85.
53 417 U.S. at 848.
-4 Id. at 849. In three lower federal court cases, where prison regulations limiting press
access to inmates were beld unconstitutional, the courts applied the traditional balancing
test. In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Bork, 370 F. Supp. 1135 (D. Mass. 1974), the right of press
access was balanced against the substantiality of the governmental interest in promulgating
the regulations. In Hillery v. Procunier, 364 F. Supp. 196 (N.D. Cal. 1973), the inmates' first
amendment right of access to the press was balanced against the state's interest in prison
discipline. Finally, in Washington Post Co. v. Kleindienst, 357 F. Supp. 770 (D.D.C. 1972),
the government's interest in prison administration was balanced against the public's right to
know of conditions in the prisons. See 54 B.U.L. REv. 670 (1974).
For contrasting views on the value of the balancing test, compare Frantz, The First
Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962), with Mendelson, The First Amendment and
the Judicial Process: A Reply to Mr. Frantz, 17 VAND. L. REv. 479 (1964).
55 See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974); note 36 and accompanying textsupra.
The degree of deference which the Supreme Court accorded to the expertise of the
Bureau of Prisons in Saxbe determined the result. On past occasi6ns, the Court had often
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Court for determining when a prison regulation would be found
constitutionally deficient. In fact, the Supreme Court directly con-
tradicted the finding of the lower courts that the ban on press-
inmate interviews was excessive in light of the legitimate press
interest in private, in-depth interviews with inmates. 56 By extend-
ing Branzburg in order to apply its general language to the specific
facts of Saxbe, the Supreme Court has found tbat the Constitution
does not require optimal conditions for newsgathering so long as
there is no likelihood of a significant constriction of the flow of
news.57
C. The Right of the Public to Know of Prison Conditions
The core of the respondents' first amendment claim in Saxbe
was the critical need for personal interviews with willing prisoners
in order to gather news about prisons effectively, accurately, and
chosen the delicate and difficult task of appraising the substantiality of the reasons advanced
by the state in support of a regulation that might infringe first amendment rights. See, e.g.,
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939); Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 548 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958). By choosing to avoid this task, the Saxbe Court did not make
clear under what circumstances a balancing test is to be applied. The Court's statement that
the press is entitled to the same newsgathering right as the general public is inconclusive
because the Court enunciated no constitutional standard for determining the scope of the
public's right to gather information. See note 100 and accompanying text infra.
5" In determining that the blanket ban on press-inmate interviews was excessive, the
district court and the court of appeals followed the "less restrictive alternative" approach.
Under this approach, state action which infringes first amendment rights is permissible only
if no other means can be devised to achieve the same goal with less abridgment of individual
freedom. 494 F.2d at 1005. See, e.g., Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101 (1972); NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
In determining the legitimacy of press-inmate interviews, the district court received
extended testimony from numerous persons, including: Arthur L. Liman, who served as
general counsel to the New York State Special Commission on Attica; Roy M. Fisher, Dean
of the School of Journalism at the University of Missouri; respondent Ben Bagdikian; and
Timothy Leland, assistant managing editor of The Boston Globe. On the basis of their
testimony and other evidence, the district court stated:
The Court has determined on the basis of detailed factual findings filed herewith
that private personal interviews are essential to accurate and effective reporting.
Ethical newspapers rarely publish articles based on unconfirmed letter communica-
tions. Reliability of such information must be determined by face-to-face confronta-
tion.
357 F. Supp. at 781.
57 It has been held that press photographers and television cameramen have no
absolute right to photograph newsworthy events wherever they may occur. See, e.g., Estes v.
Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539-40 (1965) (televising courtroom proceedings infringes fundamen-
tal right to fair trial); Seymour v. United States, 373 F.2d 629, 631-32 (5th Cir. 1967)
(upholds constitutionality of finding defendant guilty of criminal contempt for violation of
court order prohibiting taking of photographs in connection with judicial proceedings);
Tribune Review Publishing Co. v. Thomas, 254 F.2d 883, 885 (3d Cir. 1958) (upholds
constitutionality of rule forbidding photographs in courtrooms or vicinity of courtrooms).
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reliably.58 In negating these assertions, the Saxbe Court failed to
distinguish between a newsman's right to gather information and
the public's right to be informed. If the majority opinion had
analyzed these asserted rights separately, it might logically have
concluded that the newsman's right to gather information, when
combined with the public's right to be informed, outweighs the
asserted right of prison administrators to control certain inmate
behavior.5 9
The public's "right to know" was recognized by the Supreme
Court in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,60 where the Court
upheld the FCC's "fairness doctrine" as promoting "the right of
the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic,
moral, and other ideas."' 61 The Court specifically found that the
first amendment does not protect private censorship by broadcast-
ers who are licensed by the government.62 "It is the right of the
viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters," declared
the Court, "which is paramount. '63 But in Kleindienst v. Mandel,64
the government's refusal to allow an alien professor to enter the
United States was upheld by the Court, despite the contention of
several of Professor Mandel's intended listeners that the denial of a
visa to him infringed their right to hear.65 In refusing respondents'
.5 417 U.S. at 853-54 (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan & Marshall, JJ.).
59 Id. at 849.
In Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967), the Supreme Court declared that the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and press are not for the benefit of the press
so much as for the benefit of all the people.
For the theory that the first amendment encompasses the right to receive information
and ideas, see Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Lamont v. Postmaster General,
381 U.S. 301, 307-08 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S.
141, 143 (1943). If the Saxbe Court had elevated the newsman's right to gather information
and the public's right to be informed to the dignity of recognition as two separate rights, the
Court might have seen the case as one where these two separate rights outweigh the
countervailing right of prison administrators to control certain inmate behavior.
60 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
61 Id. at 390. The "fairness doctrine" requires that opposing points of view on con-
troversial issues be presented responsibly in order to best serve the public's interest in
comprehensive coverage.
62 Id. at 390-92.
63 Id. at 390. For a critical examination of the "fairness doctrine" and one potential
impact of the decision in Red Lion, see Note, Offensive Speech and the FCC, 79 YALE L.J. 1343
(1970).
64 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
The action was brought to compel the Attorney General to grant a temporary
nonimmigrant visa to a Belgian journalist and Marxian theoretician whom American
scholars had invited to participate in academic conferences in the United States. The alien
had been found ineligible for admission under §§ 212(a)(28)(D) and (G)(v) of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act of 1952, barring those who advocate or publish "the economic,
international, and governmental doctrines of world communism."
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request for press-inmate interviews, the Saxbe Court accepted the
petitioners' claim that the broad discretion of the Attorney General
in operating the federal prison system was comparable to his
far-reaching power to exclude aliens. 66 Thus, since the Director of
the Bureau of Prisons gave a "facially legitimate and bona fide
reason"67 for prohibiting press-inmate interviews, the Court in
Saxbe, as in Mandel, declined to look behind the "exercise of that
discretion"68 to see how well it balanced against the public's right to
be informed.
Particularly because prison officials exercise broad discretion
over the lives of inmates, the need for an effective check on their
actions is vital. 69 Prisons are public institutions, and the ultimate
control over the quality of their administration is exerted not by
the Attorney General, nor by the courts, but rather by the power of
public opinion.70 Since most members of the general public are
unlikely to enter prisons in order to inform themselves of the
conditions therein, they rely instead upon the media for their
information. 1
An argument can be made that by refusing to grant the press
the right to interview prisoners, the Court has avoided much
future litigation with respect to the definition of the term "press. '"72
But such litigation may still arise in the context of determining who
has the right to "converse" with unidentified inmates, in accord-
ance with the Policy Statement.73 More important, however, is the
fact that with a free press an informed public can exert its
influence within the political branches of the government, leaving
the courts to serve as a secondary forum of remedial action. 4 In
the political process, the press must play a vital role.7 5 Congres-
66 Petitioners' Brief for Certiorari at 35, Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843
(1974).
67 Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972).
68 Id.
69 Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 836 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting, joined by
Brennan & Marshall, .J.).
71 Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 861 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting, joined
by Brennan & Marshall, JJ.). Justice Powell noted in his dissent that Chief Justice Burger
had spoken out against the ignorance and apathy that characterizes the nation's approach to
the problems of prisons. Id. at 861 n.7.
71 Id. at 863; Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 841 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting, joined
by Brennan & Marshall, JJ.).
72 See Petitioners' Brief for Certiorari at 48-49, Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S.
843 (1974).
73 See note 12 supra.
7" Brief for Respondents at 34, Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
" See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
1975] 459
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
sional investigations and hearings held in response to the demands
of an enlightened citizenry can have more immediate and expan-
sive effect on the correction of abusive prison conditions than
might particular court decisions limited to the parties in interest
and their specific claims for judicial relief.
Alternative means of communication, such as correspondence,
are unlikely to be adequate guardians of the public's right to be
informed. However efficient a prison mail service may be, corre-
spondence is just too slow to permit timely coverage of fast-breaking
news events. Such "hot news"7 6 is particularly unlikely to be ade-
quately reported when reliance must be placed upon the mail. This
is true even when the correspondents are educated and experi-
enced writers. The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that
"U]ails and penitentiaries include among their inmates a high
percentage of persons who are totally or functionally illiterate,
whose educational attainments are slight, and whose intelligence is
limited."7 7 For these inmates, the mail system is virtually useless as
a means of communication. Faced with this reality, one might have
expected that the Saxbe Court would find press-inmate interviews
to be a vital means of communication not just to newsmen, but also
to the general public.
In deciding that such interviews are not constitutionally com-
pelled, the Supreme Court has taken an important step in Saxbe by
adopting the "constriction in news flow" test as -its standard of
reasonableness in place of the more traditional balancing test.7 8
Since Policy Statement 1220.1A "does not deny the press access to
76 See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 157 (1967) (opinion of Harlan, J.,
joined by Clark, Stewart, & Fortas, JJ.).
7 Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 487 (1969). See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
269 (1970), where the Supreme Court noted the inadequacy of relying on written statements
from welfare recipients:
Written submissions are an unrealistic option for most recipients, who lack the
educational attainment necessary to write effectively and who cannot obtain profes-
sional assistance. Moreover, written submissions do not afford the flexibility of oral
presentations . . . . Particularly where credibility and veracity are at issue,
written submissions are a wholly unsatisfactory basis for decision.
78 See Note, Public and Press Rights of Access to Prisoners After Branzburg and Mandel, 82
YALE L.J. 1337, 1346 n.64, 1352 n.89 (1973). According to the author of this note, the
standard of plroof established by Branzburg-whether the flow of news will be unreasonably
constricted-may ensure that the newsgathering right will rarely prevail over state practices
alleged to inhibit indirectly its exercise. But what constitutes unreasonable constriction is a
factual determination, apparently to be made by the Court on a case-by-case basis. Constric-
tion is not an absolute shutting off of the flow of news, but only a diminution of the
"amount" of news to be conveyed. Since the Court must still decide, based upon the facts of
the particular case, whether sufficient alternative means exist for informing the general
public so that the constriction is not unreasonable, one may well doubt whether the
Branzburg majority framed a workable test, as adopted subsequently in Saxbe.
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sources of information available to members of the general
public, '7 9 the test led a majority of the Court to conclude that no
unreasonable constriction had resulted, and therefore that the first
amendment freedom of the press had not been abridged.80 As
Justice Powell commented in his dissent, the test framed by the
majority has the virtue of simplicity.81 The Court does not have to
"enter the thicket of a particular factual context"82 to weigh and
balance the competing interests. Unfortunately, however, the test,
as applied to the prison environment, has weakened the protective
power of the first amendment.
83
III
ASSESSING THE IMPACT
The notion that freedom of expression is vital to the objectives
of the Constitution has led the Supreme Court in past decisions to
elevate the first amendment to a "preferred position."8 4 A variety
of devices have been employed to enable-and require-courts to
give the necessary strict scrutiny to regulations or statutes which
might endanger the preferred first amendment freedoms. Among
these are the clear and present danger test; the narrowing of the
presumption of constitutionality; the prohibitions against prior
restraint; the relaxation of the requirement of standing to sue
79 417 U.S. at 850, quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 835 (1974).
s0 Id.
81 417 U.S. at 875. (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan & Marshall, JJ.).
82 Id.
83 In Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), the Supreme Court struck down a
city ordinance which required the licensing of all persons soliciting orders for merchandise
within the city because that ordinance had been applied to the sale of religious books and
pamphlets by Jehovah's Witnesses. In so holding, Justice Douglas said:
The fact that the ordinance is "nondiscriminatory" is immaterial. The protection
afforded by the First Amendment is not so restricted. A license tax certainly does
not acquire constitutional validity because it classifies the privileges protected by the
First Amendment along with the wares and merchandise of hucksters and peddlers
and treats them all alike. Such equality in treatment does not save the ordinance.
Freedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in a preferred
position.
Id. at 115.
" See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 439 (1963); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516, 529-30 (i945). Writing for the Court in Thomas, Justice Rutledge expressed the
"preferred position" view as follows:
The case confronts us again with the duty our system places on this Court to say
where the individual's freedom ends and the State's power begins. Choice on that
border, now as always delicate, is perhaps more so where the usual presumption
supporting legislation is balanced by the preferred place given in our scheme to the
great, the indispensable democratic freedoms secured by the First Amendment.
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where first amendment freedoms are involved; and generally
higher standards of procedural due process where these freedoms
are endangered.85
Whether the first amendment should be accorded the same
judicial protection within the prison environment as on the "out-
side," however, was unresolved prior to Saxbe. 86 Numerous federal
court decisions in the prisoners' rights area suggested that when
prison regulations infringed first amendment freedoms, the com-
pelling interest test should be applied, giving due weight to the
special characteristics of the prison environment.8 7  But when
newsmen sought direct access to inmates in the early 1970's federal
courts divided over the proper standard to be applied.88
in Burnham v. Oswald, (Burnham I),89 newsmen instituted a
lawsuit against the New York State Commissioner of Correctional
Services and the Superintendent of the Attica Correctional Facility,
seeking an order from the district court to permit press interviews
of inmates in New York State correctional facilities. In the after-
math of the Attica riot, press-inmate interviews had been barred. 90
Applying a standard of reasonableness, the court in Burnham I
upheld the prohibition on interviews at the Attica facility as
reasonable in light of the circumstances existing at that time.9 1 The
following year, however, in considering whether inmates and rep-
resentatives of the news media had a right under the first and
fourteenth amendments to communicate with each other, the same
district court in Burnham 119' held that they had a right to com-
85 See McKay, The Preferencefor Freedom, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1182, 1184, 1191-93 (1959).
86 See notes 5-9 and accompanying text supra.
87 See, e.g., Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d 545, 548 (1st Cir. 1971) (restrictive effect on
first amendment rights of prisoners and public must be no greater than essential to ensure
security); Brown v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 1228, 1231 (4th Cir. 1971) (prisoner's desire to practice
religion may be restricted only on convincing showing of paramount state interest); Jackson
v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529, 541-42 (5th Cir. 1968) (heavy burden to justify racial discrimina-
tion or curtailment of first amendment freedoms); Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816, 822 (3d
Cir. 1968) (prison officials must prove religious literature creates dear and present danger
of breach of prison security or discipline or some other substantial interference with orderly
functioning of institution); Pierce v. La Vallee, 293 F.2d 233, 235 (2d Cir. 1961) (freedom of
religion and conscience a fundamental "preferred" freedom).
88 Compare Seattle-Tacoma Newspaper Guild, Local 82 v. Parker, 480 F.2d 1062 (9th
Cir. 1973) (reasonableness standard), with Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Kleindienst,
364 F. Supp. 719 (S.D. Tex. 1973) (compelling justification), and McMillan v. Carlson, 493
F.2d 1217 (Ist Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (reasonableness standard).
89 333 F. Supp. 1128 (W.D.N.Y. 1971).
90 Id. at 1128-29.
9' Id. at 1131.
92 Burnham v. Oswald, 342 F. Supp. 880 (W.D.N.Y. 1972). See Comment, Beyond Attica:
Prison Reform in New York State 1971-1973, 58 CORNELL L. REv. 924, 970-73 (1973).
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municate both by mail and by visitation. "To say that inmates have
the right to correspond," the district court reasoned, "necessarily
means that, with suitable regulation, they must also have the right
to have newsmen visitors. '93 Thus, the Burnham II court held
that an interview with a consenting inmate must be permitted
unless it is determined that to hold the interview would present a
dear and present danger of breach of the security, discipline or
orderly administration of the institution .... or that the inmate
had clearly abused his right of access to the press . on a prior
occasion.94
In 1973, another district court reached a similar result in
Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Kleindienst. 5 In that case a
newspaper publisher instituted a lawsuit against the Attorney Gen-
eral, a United States marshall, and county sheriffs, seeking de-
claratory and injunctive relief from a refusal to permit interviews
with federal prisoners incarcerated in county jails. 96 In line with
the reasoning of Burnham II, the court found that, "[i]n the
absence of a compelling State reason why the press should be
excluded, the first amendment is good enough reason to allow the
press into jails. ' 97 But that same year, in Seattle-Tacoma Newspaper
Guild, Local 82 v. Parker,98 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit returned to the reasonableness standard applied in Burn-
ham I. In upholding the ban on interviews at the McNeil Island
Penitentiary, a maximum security institution, the court found that
"the interview ban is reasonable action within the scope of the wide
discretion of the prison administrators and that it does not violate
the prisoners' First Amendment rights." 99
In agreeing with Seattle-Tacoma, the Supreme Court in Saxbe
resolved the dilemma by adopting a reasonableness standard of
review instead of the compelling interest test. To apply this stan-
dard to the freedom of the press issue, a court need only consider
whether a regulation appears reasonable as officially promulgated,
and whether, as a result, the flow of news will be unreasonably
constricted in light of the general availability of such information
to the public-at-large. There is no need for a court to look behind
the regulation in order to determine independently whether it
9' 342 F. Supp. at 885.
94 Id. at 887.
9- 364 F. Supp. 719 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
9 Id. at 720.
97 Id. at 725.
98 480 F.2d 1062 (9th Cir. 1973).
99 Id. at 1065-66.
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furthers an important or substantial governmental interest.100
Whether a nexus exists, for example, between press-inmate inter-
views and the motivation of some inmates to exert power and
create disorder within the institution is a question to be left to the
expertise of prison officials, rather than to be decided by a court.
Saxbe represents an -attempt by the Supreme Court to assist
prison officials in maintaining prison discipline by recognizing that
prison officials have the greatest familiarity with daily administra-
tive demands. Saxbe also recognizes that there is a right to gather
information, but that the right does not impose upon government
the affirmative duty to make available to newsmen sources of
information not available to members of the public
generally. 10 But one perplexing problem, which Justice Powell
summarized in his dissent, remains unsolved:
From all that appears in the Court's opinion, one would think
that any governmental restriction on access to information, no
matter how severe, would be constitutionally acceptable to the
majority so long as it does not single out the media for special
disabilities not applicable to the public at large.10 2
Whether the courts will extend the scope of Saxbe and allow the
government to deny the public and the press access to other public
institutions, such as mental hospitals and military camps, must
await future litigation.10
3
The general public shares an interest with inmates in the
100 In United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968), the Supreme Court an-
nounced a four-criteria test for determining whether incidental limitations on first amend-
ment freedoms are justifiable: (1) if the regulation is within the constitutional power of
the government; (2) if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; (3) if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and (4) if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest.
In Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413-14 (1974), Justice Powell applied the
O'Brien test to the facts before the Court and found that the challenged mail censorship
regulations of the California state prison were unconstitutional as violative of the first
amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech. The regulations authorizing censorship were
found to be far broader than was demanded by any legitimate governmental interest in
prison security, order, or prisoner rehabilitation. By refusing to apply the O'Brien test to the
facts in Saxbe, the Court was able to conclude that the Constitution does not compel
face-to-face interviews, despite the prior holding in Martinez that the Constitution does
compel uncensored prisoners' mail.
101 417 U.S. at 850.
102 1d. at 857 (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan & Marshall, JJ.).
103 The vigor of the dissenting opinions written by Justices Powell and Douglas suggests
that it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will extend the rationale of Saxbe beyond situations
involving prison-like institutions. Moreover, the reasoning of Saxbe relies heavily upon
Branzburg, where Justice Powell's vote was necessary to constitute a majority. It is significant
that in his concurring opinion in Branzburg, Justice Powell emphasized "the limited nature of
the Court's holding." 408 U.S. at 709.
[Vol. 60:446
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
indirect impact which Saxbe may have on prison conditions. 104 The
underlying premise of the Saxbe rationale was that allowing press-
inmate interviews would have led more certainly to disruption of
prison discipline than to constructive reform. However, the district
court had received testimony from corrections officials who dis-
agreed with that premise. 10 5 In fact, numerous officials testified that
press-inmate interviews actually had highly beneficial effects on
penal institutions.10 6 It is possible, therefore, that Saxbe may have
the unfortunate effect of blocking a necessary and personal con-
duit for the expression of grievances, thereby making it more
difficult to uncover legitimate sources of discontent before they
grow beyond control. If so, the impact could extend beyond the
federal prison system, since, under Pell, state prison officials may
now decide to adopt policies similar to the Federal Policy
Statement.1 0 7 In the aftermath of Saxbe, prison officials have the
responsibility of deciding whether such a step would serve or
hinder the preservation of internal order and discipline, the
maintenance of security, and the rehabilitation of inmates.
CONCLUSION
Saxbe makes clear that the public's right to know is not un-
limited, but rather is subject to reasonable constraints when con-
104 The majority view that.reporters have no greater constitutional right of access
to prisons than does the public generally will unquestionably impede efforts at
prison reform based on first-hand reports of what goes on inside the penal system.
N.Y. Times, June 27, 1974, at 44, col. 1.
105 Washington Post Co. v. Kleindienst, 357 F. Supp. 770 (D.D.C. 1972), modified and
aff'd, 494 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nom. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S.
843 (1974).
10 See Brief for Respondents at 18-23, Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843
(1974). Commissioner John 0. Boone of the Massachusetts State Department of Corrections
testified that in his experience, press-inmate interviews had not created any disciplinary
problems, but rather had helped to alleviate tensions within Massachusetts penal institutions.
In addition to the testimony of Commissioner Boone, the district court received testimony
from officials of the prison systems in Illinois, Florida, California, Iowa, New York City, the
District of Columbia, and the federal prison system. Peter Bensinger, Illinois Director of
Corrections, testified that a discretionary press-inmate interview policy was working satisfac-
torily in Illinois. Commissioner Benjamin Malcolm of the New York City Department of
Corrections testified that in his experience press-inmate interviews had been advantageous
to the correctional system by alleviating inmate tensions and improving public understand-
ing of the correctional system. Leroy Anderson, Executive Assistant to the Director of the
District of Columbia Department of Corrections, testified that the District of Columbia's
discretionary press-inmate interview policy was successful and had created no problems. Id.
On the basis of the above testimonial evidence, the district court found: "The rule
adopted by the Bureau of Prisons is a rule of comfortable convenience and not of
compelling necessity. It simply serves to prevent too sharp an inquiry into official conduct."
357 F. Supp. at 782.
107 417 U.S. 817 (1974). See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
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fronted with competing governmental interests. It also makes clear
that the freedom of the press to gather information is not absolute.
When the sole limitation imposed on newsgathering in prisons
applies equally to newsmen and the general public, the first
amendment freedom of the press is not abridged. Prisons are
institutions where access is limited, and it is constitutionally permis-
sible to enforce a regulation which prohibits press-inmate inter-
views when alternative avenues of communication exist.
In so deciding, a majority of the Supreme Court in Saxbe has
blocked the flow of news through the most professional of means.
Whenever people are incarcerated, the opportunity for human
indignities and administrative insensitivity exists.' 08 The problems
within our prisons are largely invisible to the general public, and it
is the press that must bring them to our attention. To keep the
public informed to the fullest extent, the in-depth interview is
essential. If the problems of our prisons are not to be ignored, the
most energetic support compatible with justice must be given to the
freedom of the press.
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